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COMMENT
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN INDIANA IN 1968: A COMMENT
Anita L. Morse* and Julian C. Juergensmeyer**
The passage of the Air Quality Act of 1967,' in effect, has issued a
federal mandate to the Indiana State Legislature to take direct and
immediate steps to solve the state's air pollution problems. Indiana has
had an Air Pollution Control Board since 1961, but its effectiveness may
be termed minimal. The Board was constituted by the Indiana Air
Pollution Control Law2 to operate under the existing machinery of the
Indiana State Board of Health, which concurrently houses the Water
Pollution Control Board.
The Water Pollution Control Board has been quite successful in
coping with Indiana's water pollution problem. A state legislator, Senator
Mankin, in a recent comment on the Water Control Board's work has
stated:
Since the enactment of the Indiana Law, 170 orders have
been issued to municipalities and 85 to industries. As a result
of this aggressive enforcement program, 97% of the muncipal
sewage in Indiana is treated, and 85% to 90% of the industrial
waste.'
Senator Mankin has also pointed to the success of the Water
Pollution Control Board in meeting federal directives contained in the
1965 amendment to the Water Pollution Control Act,4 which was
similiar in content to the 1967 Air Quality legislation.
The 1965 amendment to the federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act states that if a state files a letter of intent that it will,
before June 30, 1967, adopt both water quality criteria applicable
to interstate waters or portions thereof within a state, and
a plan for the implementation and enforcement of the water
quality criteria adopted, then, if the Secretary of the Interior
accepts the state's plan, such state criteria and plan shall there-
* J.D., Indiana University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-4601 to -4608 (Supp. 1967).
3. Mankin, States Must Seize Initiative in Pollution Problems, 2 LEGISLATIVE
LEDGER 4 (1967).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1965).
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after be the federal water quality standards applicable to such
interstate waters or portions thereof.
However, if the state does not take such action, the Secre-
tary may prepare regulations himself, and if the state does not,
within six months of publication of the Secretary's report,
adopt its own consistent standards, the Secretary shall promul-
gate his regulations.
Why was Indiana's plan among the first of those to be
approved? Apparently, most states thought that the federal
government required only that they develop and adopt criteria
applicable to their state waters. However, the law also requires
that they adopt a plan of implementation. So Indiana proposed
criteria but in addition it documented all Indiana towns and
industries which have pollution problems, along with a deadline
for each to meet. There is also a salvation clause for exotic prob-
lems-ten years.
As a result, Indiana got early acceptance by the federal
government and established its own "federal standards" for
Indiana waters. The probable reason why only ten states thus
far have met the federal requirements is that most state govern-
ments seem to be unwilling to make future commitments for
eradicating their problems.
The result of the Secretary's adoption of Indiana's plan is
that now the hierarchy of city-county-state-federal government
is unbroken in Indiana so far as water pollution standards
which Indiana itself has prescribed for interstate waters.5
This admirable record in matters concerning water pollution has not
been matched by the activities of the Indiana Air Pollution Control Board.
Section one of the Indiana Air Pollution Control Act states:
It is the intention of this Act that primary responsibility
for the control of the emission of air contaminants into the
atmosphere shall rest with the responsible local governmental
agency and that affirmative, remedial action by this State shall
be taken only in those areas of this State where no local air
pollution law or regulation consistent with the provision of this
Act is now, or hereafter, in effect, or where, after hearing, the
Control Board determines that the local law or regulation is
not being enforced adequately and, in the opinion of the Control
Board, it is not intended that it be so enforced.6
5. Mankin, supra note 3, at 4.
6. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4601 (Supp. 1967).
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Even though fewer than ten local air-pollution ordinances have been
passed in Indiana, action by the State agency has been minimal.7
However, the federal Air Quality Act of 1967 definitely compels
action by the state as well as a legislative redrafting of our present air
pollution legislation. The procedure for adopting local standards under
the Air Quality Act differs from the procedure followed under the Water
Pollution Control Act. Section 107 of the Air Quality Act provides:
The Secretary shall, after consultation with appropriate
advisory committees and Federal departments and agencies,
from time to time, but as soon as practicable, develop and
issue to the States such criteria of air quality as in his judg-
ment may be requisite for the protection of public health and
welfare.'
Unlike the water pollution standards, the air quality standards which the
states must adopt under Section 108,' along with a plan for implementa-
tion, must be in accord with the criteria promulgated by the federal
government. Furthermore, the Air Quality Act requires that compliance
with federal criteria be accomplished by state action in the first instance.
This necessitates an immediate and total revision of the present Indiana
law to meet the new federal provisions.
This comment concerns two areas which should be carefully con-
sidered by the legislators in their deliberations over the revision of the
present statute. The first is the effect of a provision such as Section Five
7. INDIANA AIR POLLUTION BD., 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 5, 7. 10 (1966). The dearth
of activity is explainable at least in part by the inadequacy of the Board's budget. Id.
8. 81 Stat. 485, § 107(b) (1) (1967).
9. Id. Section 108(c) (1) of the Air Quality Act provides:
If, after receiving any air quality criteria and recommended control techniques
issued pursuant to section 107, the Governor of a State, within ninety days of
such receipt, files a letter of intent that such State will within one hundred
and eighty days, and from time to time thereafter, adopt, after public hearings,
ambient air quality standards applicable to any designated air quality control
region or portions thereof within such State and within one hundred and
eighty days thereafter, and from time to time as may be necessary, adopts a
plan for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such standards
of air quality adopted, and if such standards and plan are established in
accordance with the letter of intent and if the Secretary determines that such
State standards are consistent with the air quality criteria and recommended
control techniques issued pursuant to section 107; that the plan is consistent
with the purposes of the Act insofar as it assures achieving such standards
of air quality within a reasonable time; and that a means of enforcement by
State action, including authority comparable to that in subsection (k) of this
section, is provided, such State standards and plan shall be the air quality
standards applicable to such State. If the Secretary determines that any
revised State standards and plan are consistent with the purposes of this Act
and this subsection, such standards and plan shall be the air quality standards
applicable to such State.
81 Stat. 485, § 108 (c) (1) (1967).
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in the present Indiana Air Pollution Control Act upon the rights of
individuals to take legal action against air pollution. The second area
includes selective comments on present problems in the drafting and
implementation of control statutes.
PRIVATE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION
Possible Impact of Section Five.
Section Five of the Indiana Air Pollution Control Act provides:
The discharge into the outdoor atmosphere of air contam-
inants so as to cause air pollution and create a public nuisance
is contrary to the public policy of the State of Indiana and
the provisions of this Act.
The jurisdiction of the Control Board to receive and
entertain complaints shall be limited to complaints concerning
air contaminant sources located in areas in this State where no
local air pollution law or regulation consistent with the pro-
visions of this Act is now, or hereafter, in effect or where, after
a hearing, the Control Board determines the local law or
regulation is not being enforced adequately and in the opinion
of the Control Board, it is not intended that it be so enforced.'
It may be argued that this provision deprives a citizen of his right to
seek a judicial remedy for the damages caused to him by air pollution.
Such a result could be reached through the application of the principle of
primacy of administrative jurisdiction. This theory would give to the
state the exclusive jurisdiction over areas which were previously con-
sidered amenable to private action.
The Indiana courts have not considered this question, but it is the
unofficial opinion of the State Board of Health that Section Five does not
exclude the public from air pollution control litigation. In any case, the
problem is readily alleviated by the inclusion of a savings clause such as
the one in comparable California legislation." The leading case in this
area, Harvey v. Renken, 2 an Oregon state decision, held that private
rights are effectively saved by the inclusion in the statute, expressly or
impliedly, of a savings clause.
Scope of Private Control
It is submitted that the ability to pursue private remedies is impor-
10. IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-4605 (Supp. 1967).
11. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 731 (a) (West 1954). Cf. Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal. 2d
218, 200 P.2d 790 (1948) ; Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (149).
12. 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
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tant to the total air pollution control problem in this state. Private control
has been an effective, if little used, weapon against air pollution offenders,
particularly since it poses a threat of the economic consequences of
pollution.
What is meant by private control? Generally speaking, it is the right
individuals have, absent any statute or ordinance on the subject, to bring
suit against other individuals, corporations and even governmental units
for compensation for the personal or property damages suffered from air
pollution and/or for an injunction against the continuance of the pollu-
tion.'3
In considering the possible scope of private control, it will be helpful
to use an illustration. Assume a Hoosier family that lives in the close
vicinity of an industrial plant emitting substances into the air which
injure the lungs, of the young children, kill or injure livestock kept on the
pemises, and produce odiferous substances. There is no local ordinance
giving these individuals a right or method of complaining. Also, there
is no air pollution control board that can or will come to their aid. What
legal rights may these individuals assert?
There are three principal legal theories on which the family may
base its claim against the polluters: (1) nuisance, (2) trespass, and
(3) negligence.
1. Nuisance.
A nuisance action is based upon alleged interference with the
plaintiff's enjoyment of property."4 The right of a man to enjoy his
property is clearly a right that a court will protect-and air pollution
has long been recognized as a potential source of interference with the
enjoyment of property. In 1611, Lord Coke held that an action grounded
in nuisance would lie against a defendant whose hogsty odors "con-
taminated and infected the air" of the plaintiff. 5
The Supreme Court of Georgia in a case decided in this century
stated :
Every person has the right to have the air diffused over
his premises, whether located in the city or country, in its
13. For a more complete discussion of the private aspects of air pollution control see
Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967
DUKE L.J. 1126.
14. IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-505 (1961) provides:
Nuisance: Whatever is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance,
and the subject of an action.
15. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
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natural state and free from artifical impurities."
Not all courts are this lenient with private citizen suing air
polluters. This is especially true when the individual seeks an injunction
against further pollution. Courts that are quite willing to award damages
and in effect make the polluter pay for the harm his pollution has caused
the plaintiff are reluctant to enjoin continued pollution. In the injunction
situation the courts start balancing the equities, i.e., comparing the harm
caused to the plaintiff with the benefit derived from the activity which
causes the pollution.
A brief look at two cases that reach opposite results will illustrate
the range of ideas the courts have developed.
In Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company,'7
a 1904 Tennessee case, the court found, in reference to the damages the
plaintiffs suffered as a result of the air pollutants emitted by defendants,
that :
Their timber and crop interests have been badly injured,
and they have been annoyed and discommoded by the smoke
so that the complainants are prevented from using and enjoy-
ing their farms and homes as they did prior to the inauguration
of these enterprises. The smoke makes it impossible for the
owners of farms within the area of the smoke zone to subsist
their families thereon with the degree of comfort they enjoyed
before. They cannot raise and harvest their customary crops,
and their timber is largely destroyed."8
Although the court awarded damages to the plaintiffs, it refused to
grant an injunction. The Tennessee court justified its decision by stating:
It i's found, in substance, that, if the injunctive relief
sought be granted, the defendants will be compelled to stop
operations, and their property will become practically worthless,
the immense business conducted by them will cease, and they
will be compelled to withdraw from the State. It is a necessary
deduction from the foregoing that a great and increasing in-
dustry in the State will be destroyed, and all of the valuable
copper properties of the State become worthless.'
In Hulbert v. California Portland Cement,20 a 1911 California case,
16. Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (Sup.
Ct. 1919).
17. 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
18. 83 S.W. at 660.
19. Id. at 661.
20. 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
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the court found that the cement dust emitted by defendant:
[I]s, and for some years past has been, falling upon the pro-
perties of the plaintiffs, covering and coating the ground, filter-
ing through their homes, into all parts thereof, forming an
opaque semi-cemented encrustation upon the upper sides of all
exposed flowers and foliage, particularly leaves of citrus trees,
and leaving ineradicable, yet withal plainly discernable, mark
and evidence of dust, dusty deposits, and grayish coloring
resulting therefrom, upon the citrus fruits. The encrustations
above mentioned, unlike the deposits occasionally occurring on
leaves because of the presence of undue amounts of road dust
or field dust, are not dissipated by the strongest winds, nor
washed off through the action of the most protracted rains.
Their presence, from repeated observations, seems to be as
continuous as their hold upon the leaves seems tenacious. The
[lower] court further found that the deposit of dust on the
fruit decreased its value; that the constant presence of dust on
the limbs and leaves of the trees rendered the cultivation of the
ground and the harvesting of the crop more costly than it
would have been under ordinary conditions; and that said dust
added to the usual and ordinary discomforts of life by its
presence in the homes of the plaintiffss
The defendant stressed the importance of its product and the great
expense that would be involved in any diminution of the pollution. How-
ever, the court enjoined further operation of defendant's plant unless it
installed air pollution control devices.
Although the first reaction of those concerned with air pollution
control is to favor the Hulbert decision rather than Ducktow, it is not
really practical to oppose the reasoning of the court in Ducktown. What
is regrettable about the case is not that the Tennessee court based its
decision on the greatest good to the greatest number, but that the court
did not consider the harm caused by the air pollution to citizens other
than the plaintiffs. It is only when the court takes into consideration the
full ramifications of the pollution as well as the ramifications of the
defendant's enterprise that there can be a true balancing of the equities.
There has been a surprisingly small amount of litigation in this area in
Indiana. However, the leading case, Owen v. Phillips,2" would indicate
that Indiana follows the "balancing the equity" approach of Ducktown.
The Owen case concerned an attempt to enjoin the rebuilding of a flour
21. 118 P. at 931.
22. 73 Ind. 284 (1881)
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mill which had been destroyed by fire. The neighboring residents alleged
that the mill created a nuisance by polluting the surrounding air and
water. The court stated:
It is not every injury which will support an action for
damages that will entitle the complainant to relief by injunction.
There are solid reasons for this rule. A lawful business may
be so conducted as to become a nuisance, but, in order to
warrant interference by injunction, the injury must be a ma-
terial and essential one. Damages may be paid by the author
of the nuisance and the business not be stopped, but if injunction
issues then the right to conduct the business is at an end. The
necessity which will authorize the granting of the writ of in-
junction, to restrain the carrying on of a business, lawful in
itself, must be a strong and impervious one. If it were other-
wise, all mills and manufacturies might be stopped at the
demand of those to whom they caused annoyance, even though
the injury complained of might be slight and trivial."
It is to be noted, however, that the court remanded the case on the
question of damages. The court stated that whether a business was or
not a nuisance did not depend entirely upon the notions of the residents
of the vicinity. The court said that, while these were an important factor:
The owner of property is entitled to enjoy the ordinary
comforts of life, and that right is not to be measured by the
notions of the persons of a particular locality .... No man has
a right to take from another the enjoyment of what are regarded
as the reasonable and essential comforts of life, because the
notions of the people of a given locality may not correctly
estimate the standards of such comforts.24
The Indiana court, therefore, is sympathetic to the private pollution
controller. The recent case of Hedrick v. Tubbs25 indicates that relief
through injunction is possible. In Hedrick the court found a continu-
ing nuisance and enjoined the burnnig of trash and rubbish which carried
smoke, dirt, and odors onto plaintiff's property. Obviously, there will
not be many litigious neighbors who will go as far as the state supreme
court to protect their backyard from garbage pollution, but it is possible
to do so as long as the right of the private citizen to defend himself
against air pollution is preserved by our statute.
23. Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 295.
25. 120 Ind. App. 326, 92 N.E.2d 561 (1950).
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2. TrespasS.
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company,28 a 1959 Oregon case, invol-
ved a suit for damages based on an alleged injury caused to plaintiff's cat-
tle by ingesting fluorides emitted by defendant's plant. Plaintiff brought
his suit in trespass. Defendant appealed the lower court's judgment for
plaintiff on the ground that there had been no entry onto the plaintiff's
real property and therefore no trespass. The Supreme Court of Oregon
upheld the lower court and stated:
The view recognizing a trespassory invasion where there is
no "thing" which can be seen with the naked eye undoubtedly
runs counter to the definition of trespass expressed in some
quarters. It is quite possible that in an earlier day when
science had not yet peered into the molecular and atomic
world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion
through unseen physical instrumentalities into the requirement
that a trespass can result only from a direct invasion. But in
this atomic age even the uneducated know the great and awful
force contained in the atom and what it can do to a man's
property if it is released. In fact, the now famous equation
E- mc2 has taught us that mass and energy are equivalents and
that our concept of "things" must be reframed. If these obser-
vations in science in relation to the law of trespass should
appear theoretical and unreal in the abstract, they become very
practical and real to the possessor of land when the unseen
force cracks the foundation of his house. The force is just as
real if it is chemical in nature and must be awakened by the
intervention of another agency before it does harm."
Whether the Indiana courts would entertain an action based on
trespass is problematical. In Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company v.
Simon,2" portions of the complaint were dismissed because the court held
valid the defense that the statute of limitations had run as to an action
grounded in nuisance. However, the court did not indicate that the plain-
tiff suggested or that the court entertained any theory of trespass. The
Hedrick case, decided on the theory of continuing nuisance, indicates that
the court might be sympathetic to an action grounded in trespass. In other
jurisdictions the courts in the fluoride caess 9 have frequently reiterated
26. 342 P.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1959).
27. Id. at 793-94 (citations omitted).
28. 40 Ind. 278 (1872).
29. Fairview Farms v. Reynolds, 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959); Arvidson v.
Reynolds, 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342
P.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1959).
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
the diminishing difference between trespass and continuing nuisance, and
a plaintiff in an Indiana court might well succeed with a trespass claim
based on the sound authority of the recent decisions in sister states.
3. Negligence.
In Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation,"' a 1954 California
case, Mrs. Hagy sought recovery for damages suffered to her larynx
when she and her husband drove through smog containing injurious
sulfuric acid compounds negligently emitted from defendant's plant.
The court described the plaintiffs' theory as follows:
The theory of plaintiffs' case is (1) that Mrs. Hagy had
a cancer of the larynx before her exposure to the smog but it
had not been diagnosed as such, and her condition was such
that she did not know it; (2) that her exposure to the smog
and the irritation therefrom "lighted up" the dormant cancer;
(3) that immediately following the exposure she lost her
voice; (4) that her doctors then pressed their examinations,
ruled out tuberculosis, took a biopsy of the larynx, and deter-
mined therefrom that she had a cancer of the larynx; (5) that a
complete laryngectomy was then performed and (6) that such
operation might have been averted had she not been exposed
to the smog and irritation therefrom."'
In spite of defendant's strong arguments that no causal relation had been
shown between its air pollutants and plaintiff's laryngectomy, the appeals
court affirmed the verdict for plaintiff.
Private Control in Indiana.
The purpose in setting forth some examples of nuisance, trespass
and negligence actions based on pollution-caused damage has been to
demonstrate that without any public control legislation or machinery,
individuals have legal avenues through which they may recover for air
pollution-caused injury. Such recoveries have direct control consequences
if the court grants an injunction. But even if only damages are awarded,
there are indirect control consequences since the award makes the
pollution more expensive for defendants, and the cost of the present
judgment plus the fear of future judgments furnishes economic motiva-
tions for them to control their pollution.
It is to be noted, however, that few Indiana cases have been cited
as examples. Although Indiana has its share of smoke and odor nuisance-
30. 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1954).
31. 265 P.2d at 90.
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oriented cases,8 2 air pollution cases of the magnitude of those just
discussed have not reached the courts of record in Indiana. It would be
pleasant to explain this by suggesting that air pollution is not the
serious problem in Indiana that it is elsewhere. Unfortunately, this expla-
nation seems foreclosed by the designation of both the Calumet area
and Indianapolis as among the twenty most polluted areas in the United
States.88 Perhaps Hoosiers are not as litigious as Californians, for
example, or perhaps their claims have been settled out of court or not
appealed to the two courts of record. Perhaps the Indiana Bar has been
slow to realize the potential for private recovery for air pollution-caused
damage. One can only speculate as to which of these factors is respon-
sible, but it is submitted that there is nothing different about Indiana
law that would preclude such private actions.
PUBLIC CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION
By stressing private avenues of pollution control it is not suggested
that their availability lessens the need for or importance of public control.
Any control through the assertion of private rights depends on the
willingness and financial ability of individuals to go to court.8" At our
present rate of pollution, our population would suffocate before the private
approach could appreciably alleviate the problem.
Fortunately, therefore, the private controller has now been joined by
the public in the form of air pollution control regulation. The passage of
32. Hedrick v. Tubbs, 120 Ind. App. 326, 92 N.E.2d 561 (1950); City of
New Albany v. Armstrong, 22 Ind. App. 15, 53 N.E. 185 (1899); Windfall
Mfg. Co. v. Patterson, 148 Ind. 414, 47 N.E. 2 (1897); Owen v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 284
(1881); Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Simon, 40 Ind. 278 (1872); Smith v. Fitzgerald,
24 Ind. 316 (1865).
33. CONSEmVATION FOUNDATION, C.F. LETTER 8 (1967).
34. For example:
While air pollution, particularly smoke, was not a nuisance per se at common
law, evidence in each particular case could show that it was in fact a nuisance.
Despite this abstract protection of the common law against air pollution,
private litigation for relief from the effects of such pollution has been unsuccess-
ful as a means of control. The remedy of injunction is so drastic as to limit
its use to extreme cases, and the collection of damages where a plaintiff is
successful is often merely a recurrent fee that the defendant is willing to
pay. The failure of individual action as an answer to the problem is not at
all surprising in face of the following facts of legal life: (a) The suffering of
any given individual has often been neither significant nor irreparable, nor
readily enough demonstrable in terms of dollars of damage to satisfy the
doctrine that limits the granting of effectively deterrent kinds of relief; (b) The
difficulty and cost of investigating and of properly proving from among all poss-
ible sources, the source or sources responsible for a given injury have been too far
out of proportion to the likely benefits of successful litigation; (c) In an urban
setting, pollution may stem from innumerable sources, many of which, although
contributing to the harm complained of, constitute no readily indentifiable source
of injury.
Rogers and Edelman, Air Pollution Control Legislation, 2 AIR POLLUTION 428 (1962).
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the Air Quality Act of 1967 heightens interest in the content of our
public regulations.
Indiana air pollution control law leaves regulation up to local units
of government. 5 The 1965 Annual Report of the Indiana Air Pollution
Control Board lists six full-time air pollution control programs in the
state." There is also, at this time, an Indiana-Illinois compact on Air
Pollution Control which is being considered for Congressional approval.
The compact was passed by the Indiana legislature in 1965 and is not
yet out of committee in Congress.8 The immediate problem faced by the
state of Indiana is the need to revise and strengthen the present legislation
to meet the requirements necessary for federal approval. This is not only
because the negative aspects of federal intervention in the case of state
inaction are important, but also because there are many positive areas of
assistance and benefits to be gained from the federal program through
state action.
Section 101 (a) (3) of the federal Air Quality Act states that "the
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of State and local governments." 8 The Act proceeds to
list the types of support that are available to state governmental units,
state agencies, interstate agencies, and private bodies, for research in and
implementation of programs for the control of air pollution. But these
programs must meet the criteria established by the federal government
through the agency of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
It is to this problem of tailoring our legislation to federal standards that
we now direct our attention. A thorough analysis of the Indiana Air
Pollution Control Act is not attempted in this discussion. However, a few
of the major areas which should be critically analyzed are pointed out
with the intention of bringing them within the careful scrutiny of the
legislators in their deliberations over the revision of the present Indiana
air pollution legislation.
Problems included in this discussion are those which may arise from
our legislation relating to the definition of air pollution, the enforcement
of the regulations issued under the legislation, and the procedural pro-
blems raised by recent Supreme Court decisions on right of entry and
inspection clauses.
Definition of Air Pollution
Article II of the Indiana-Illniois Air Pollution Control Compact
reads :
35. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-4601 to -4608 (Supp. 1967).
36. INDIAN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BD., 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1966).
37. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-4621 to -4624 (Sup. 1967).
38. 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
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As used in this compact "air pollution" means the pre-
sence in the outdoor atmosphere of particulate matter, dust,
fumes, gas, mist, smoke or vapor, or any combination thereof
in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and duration
as to be injurious to human, plant, or animal life, or to property,
or which unreasonably interferes with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life and property.39
This definition must be read in relationship with Article I of the
Compact, "Findings and Purposes," subsection (c) :
It is recognized by the party states that no single standard
for outdoor atmosphere is applicable to all areas within the
two party states due to such variables as population densities,
topographic and climatic characteristics and existing or pro-
jected land use and economic development. The guiding prin-
ciple of this compact shall be that air pollution originating with-
in a party state shall not injuriously affect humans, plants,
animal life, or property, or unreasonably interfere with the
enjoyment of life and property in the other party state.4"
The Indiana Air Pollution Control Law defines air pollution as:
[The] presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more
air contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such character-
istics and duration as to be injurious to human, plant or
animal life or to property, or which unreasonably interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life and property.4 '
Subsection (d) defines air contaminants as, "dust, fumes, gas, mist,
smoke, or vapor, or any combination thereof." The addition of "particu-
late matter" seems to be the only innovation in the compact, and this
would seem to be covered by the other listings in the Indiana law.
Compare these definitions with the draft in the Harvard Journal on
Legislation for a projected Illinois-Missouri Compact:
Article I. Definitions (b) "Air Pollution" means the presence
in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air contaminants in
a quantity and of a duration which is or may tend to be
injurious to public health, or welfare, animal or plant life, or
property, or which might unreasonably interfere with the enjoy-
ment of life or property.2
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4621 (Supp. 1967).
40. Id.
41. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4602(c) (Supp. 1967).
42. 4 HAtv. J. LEGIs. 369, 373 (1967) (emphasis added).
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Some consider a "may tend to be" standard such as that described above
to be too vague for effective enforcement by regulators or definition by
the courts. On the other hand, the comments to the Harvard draft
criticize the Indiana-Illinois Compact, and by implication the Indiana
control statute, for failing to list potential hazards in its definition. The
commentators argue for the Harvard definition by stating:
The words "may tend to be injurious" obviate the necessity
for proving that contaminants have actually harmed someone
or something before they can be declared to constitute pollution."'
It is interesting to note that the Gary Ordinance No. 67-19 on air pollu-
tion, in its draft from, has adopted the "are or may tend to be injurious"
definition of air pollution. The Gary Ordinance also broadens the scope
of air contaminants to include smoke, soot, fly ash, dust, cinders, dirt,
noxious or obnoxious acids, fumes, oxides, gases, vapors, odors, toxic
or radioactive substances, waste, particulate, solid, liquid, or gaseous
matter, or any other materials in the outdoor atmosphere.
Whether a practically or unconstitutionally vague "may tend to be"
standard is worth the risk is a question that cannot be decided without
the help of scientists and engineers in learning the nature and effect of
pollutants. It is suggested, however, that the scope of the Air Quality Act
demands such a standard and that the federal criteria will alleviate
definitional problems.
Enforcement of Pollution Regulations.
However specific, general, or all-inclusive the legislation is, the
principal problem for those who are concerned with its enforcement is
whether there exists in the law adequate enforcement machinery. The
Indiana statute states :
[P]rimary responsibility for the control of the emission of
air contaminants into the atmosphere shall rest with the respon-
sible local governmental agency and that affirmative, remedial
action by this state shall be taken only in those areas of this state
where no local air pollution law or regulation consistent with
the provisions of this act is now, or hereafter, in effect or where,
after hearing, the control board determines that the local law
or regulation is not being enforced adequately and, in the
opinion of the control board, it is not intended that it be so
enforced.44
43. Id. at 373.
44. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4601 (Supp. 1967).
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Presumably, sanctions are to be contained in the ordinances passed by
the local governmental units. The Gary Ordinance, for example, contains
appropriate penalties for violations. But through, what means does the
Board force local governmental units to either adopt air pollution
legislation or to enforce legislation? May a private citizen obtain a
remedy against a recalcitrant governmental unit or is the Board the
only enforcement agency? And if the Board proceeds against a private
wrongdoer in a case where local legislation does not exist, what standards
is the Board to be guided by and what sanctions or penalties may be
placed upon the wrongdoer to gain compliance with the Board's deci-
sions? The Indiana Air Pollution Act 5 is within the province of the
Indiana Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act which
provides:
Any agency may bring a proceeding in equity against
any person against whom a final order or determination has
been made to compel compliance therewith, and the court or
judge thereof in vacation in such action shall have jurisdiction
to enforce such order or determination by prohibitory or man-
datory injunction."
Apparently, in the context of compelling a governmental unit to pass or
to enforce legislation, the Board's sole enforcement sanction is the
injunctive power of the court against the proper person-whoever that
might be-charged with the enactment or enforcement of air pollution
control regulations. In reference to the Board's powers to enforce the air
pollution statute in the absence of local regulations, it would, once more,
appear to have only the use of the injunction as a sanction. This is a
weak area of the state statute, and it definitely needs to be revised. A
successful attempt to control the pollution problem in Indiana cannot be
made without real enforcement power lying in the hands of the agency
responsible for the solution. And, as has been noted, the Air Quality Act
demands an adequate program for implementation in order to gain
federal approval.
To complete this somewhat dismal picture, the permissive quality of
the Indiana-Illinois Compact provides no solution for the problem of
enforcement. Article IV, "Functions," allows the Commission created by
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4606 (Supp. 1967).
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3027 (1961) (emphasis added). One must look to IND.
ANN. STAT. § 63-3002, "Definitions," for a definition of person:
The word "person" whenever used in this act shall mean and include any
person, firm, association, partnership or corporation. It shall also include
municipalities and all political subdivisions of government against which any
agency may make an order or determination.
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the compact to make studies of air pollution existent in the two states
and section (d) provides that:
No less than six months after the commission furnishes a
report to the appropriate state and local air pollution control
agencies pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article
and, if the recommendations made in such report for the preven-
tion, abatement or control of air pollution from a specific
source or sources have not been implemented, or if the appro-
priate state or local air pollution control agencies have not
taken sufficient action to prevent, abate, or control the air pol-
ution, the commission may after a duly conducted and con-
stituted hearing on due notice issue an order or orders upon
any municipality, corporation, person or other entity causing
or contributing to air pollution in a state other than that in
which the air pollution originates...
And subsection (e) provides:
It shall be the duty of the municipality, corporation, person,
or other entity to comply with any such order issued against
it or him by the commission. Any court of competent juris-
diction shall entertain and determine any action or proceeding
brought by the commission to enforce any such order against
any municipality, corporation, person, or other entity domiciled
or located within such state.... ."
The means of eliciting compliance with the court orders is totally ignored
in the legislation and, again, we face the situation of a well-intentioned
statute which is incomplete because of a lack of sanctions and enforcement
procedure. It is to be noted that the Air Quality Act of 1967, unlike its
predecessors, provides for federal jurisdiction over interstate pollution
upon the application of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
to the Attorney General." Also, the federal Act provides that, in the
47. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4621 (Supp. 1967).
48. Id.
49. 81 Stat. 485, § 108(c) (4) (i) (1967) provides:
Whenever, on the basis of surveys, studies and reports, the Secretary finds
that the ambient air quality of any air quality control region or portion
thereof is below the air quality standards established under this subsection, and
he finds that such lowered air quality results from the failure of a State to take
reasonable action to enforce such standards, the Secretary shall notify the
affected State or States, persons contributing to the alleged violation, and other
interested parties of the violation of such standards. If such failure does not
cease within one hundred and eighty days from the date of the Secretary's
notification, the Secretary-
(i) in the case of pollution of air which is endangering the health or welfare
of persons in a State other than that in which the discharge or discharges
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case of intrastate pollution, the Secretary may, at the request of the
Governor of the state, assist in the institution of state proceedings or
proceedings brought by the Attorney General in a United States District
Court, to secure abatement.50
The lack of specific jurisdictional power and positive sanctions in
present Indiana legislation creates a definite need for careful revision. It
is suggested that such revision should consider enactment of the less
drastic economic sanctions, so that the need for abatement through total
injunction is avoided by an earlier solution of the problem.5'
Right of Entry and Inspection.
Section 35-4607 of the Indiana Air Pollution Control Act provides:
It shall be unlawful ... to refuse to permit such personnel
to perform their duty by refusing them, after proper identi-
fication or presentation of a written order of the control board,
entrance at reasonable hours to any premises.52
The Indiana-Illinois Compact, Article VI, "Right of Entry," provides:
The commission acting by any duly designated officer, employee
or agent thereof, shall have the right to enter at all reasonable
times in or upon any private or public property except private
(causing or contributing to such pollution) originate, may request the Attorney
General to bring a suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate
United States district court to secure abatement of the pollution.
50. 81 Stat. 485, § 108(c) (4) (ii) (1967) provides:
(ii) in the case of pollution of air which is endangering the health or welfare of
persons only in the State in which the discharge or discharges (causing or
contributing to such pollution) originate, at the request of the Governor of
such State, shall provide such technical and other assistance as in his judg-
ment is necessary to assist the State in judicial proceedings to secure abatement
of the pollution under State or local law, or, at the request of the Governor of
such State, shall request the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the
United States in the appropriate United States district court to secure abatement
of the pollution.
51. It might be noted at this point that there exists a certain amount of
disagreement concerning the effectiveness of positive tax incentives to en-
courage control measures as opposed to negative sanctions against emissions.
While taxation incentives may be well suited for water pollution problems
where the tax can be based on and used for the cost of purifying the water,
air pollution offers no such solution. There is, at present, no method of
purifying the air once it has been polluted. Therefore it is urged that negative
sanctions in the form of gradually ascending fines be placed on emissions.
And if the recalcitrant offender cannot justify his failure to install proper
controls within a specific time or if the damage caused by the emissions out-
weighs the economic and social value of the operation, then an injunction should
be issued.
Mills, Economic Incentives in Air Pollution Control, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR
POLLUTION 40 (Wolozin ed. 1966).
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4607 (Supp. 1967).
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residences for the purpose of inspecting and investigating any
condition which the board shall have reasonable cause to believe
to be an air pollution source."
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Camara v. Municipal Court of
City and County of San Francisco5 and See v. City of Seattle,5"
declared unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourth Amendment, ordin-
ances which granted to city officials the right of inspection and entry
without a search warrant. The cases expressly overruled an earlier
Supreme Court decision which had upheld a state court conviction of a
homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector to enter
and inspect her premises without a search warrant.5"
In the Camara case the plaintiff was a private citizen in a multiple
dwelling; the city ordinance read:
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies,
so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties,
shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right
to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises
in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the
Municipal Code."
The appellant refused to allow the inspectors access without a warrant,
and a complaint was filed, charging him with a violation of the ordin-
ance. The case went to the United States Supreme Court on a special
writ of prohibition, and the Court declared the unconstitutionality of the
ordinance and granted the writ.
The companion case, See v. City of Seattle, has much more potential
impact on the inspection and entry provisions in air pollution control
ordinances. Here the appellant was a commercial warehouseman. The
ordinance specifically excluded private dwellings:
It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he
may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of
dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of
ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable
to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title,
and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.55
The Court considered the issue as being whether the Camara rule
applied to similar inspections of commercial structures which are used as
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4621 (Supp. 1967).
54. 87 Sup. Ct. 1727 (1967).
55. 87 Sup. Ct. 1737 (1967).
56. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
57. 87 Sup. Ct. at 1729 (quoting § 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code).
58. 87 Sup. Ct. at 1738 (quoting § 8.01.050 of the Seattle Fire Code).
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private residences, and held that it did. It is interesting to note the
language of the Supreme Court in discussing the implications of this
ruling:
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises
may be issued only after access is refused, since surprise may
often be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business
establishments, the reasonableness of warrants issued in advance
of inspections will necessarily vary with the nature of the
regulation involved and may differ from standards applicable
to private homes. 9
The impact of this language is left open for speculation.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Clark deplored the possibilities
foreshadowed by this decision. Pointing out the futility of the majority's
statement on the case of obtaining a warrant Justice Clark stated that, in
truth, search warrants, "will be printed up in pads of a thousand or
more-with space for the street number to be inserted-and issued by
magistrates in broadcast fashion as a matter of course."6 He asked
whether this is not merely constructing an absured facade around our
Constitution.
Whether Clark's prediction will obtain is purely speculative. The
decisions, however, do illustrate the necessity of careful drafting of an
inspection clause that is both constitutionally sound and utilitarian in
operation. The starting point is a careful analysis of what the Court
thinks must be included in such a clause in order to protect the individual's
right against illegal search and seizure. Also included within this analysis
must be the power of the state to protect the interest of the public
against the individual. There is, on its face, no reason why a clearly-
stated inspection clause with well-defined limitations should not meet the
objections of the Court. It is suggested that the inclusion of an effective
inspection clause is a vital part of a successful control act.
These are but a few of the elements of the Indiana air pollution
control legislation which must be seriously considered in a revision of the
present laws. Analysis and revision of areas which require scientific
knowledge, economic training, or other areas of competence are also part
of the enormous task facing our legislature. A cooperative effort by
members of every interested sector of the population-business, education,
government, the professions, and the general public-is necessary if
Indiana is to have a sound piece of legislation which will meet the
challenge of the Air Quality Act of 1967.
59. Id. at 1740 n.6.
60. Id. at 1741.
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